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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION: SUPERMAJORITY VOTING
REQUIREMENTS-Gordon v.

Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).

On April 29, 1968, the Board of Education of Roane County, West
Virginia, submitted to its electorate a proposal calling for the issuance
of general obligation bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used for
the construction of new school buildings and the improvement of existing educational facilities. At the same election, by separate ballot,
the voters were asked to authorize the Board to levy additional taxes
to support current expenditures and capital improvements. Both proposals failed to receive the requisite sixty percent affirmative vote1 and
were defeated.
Following the election, respondents, a group of concerned parents,
appeared before the Board on behalf of themselves and other persons
who had voted in favor of the proposals. They demanded that the
Board authorize the bonds and the additional taxes. The Board refused and respondents brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that West Virginia's constitutional and statutory supermajority re-

1. West Virginia, like many other states, requires extraordinary majority approval
in "direct elections." The relevant constitutional provisions for general levies include a
debt limitation of five percent of the value of taxable property, as well as time limitations and supermajority requirements. W. VA. CONST. art. 10, § 8 (1950). There is a
companion statutory requirement that bond issues for the improvement of educational
facilities receive sixty percent voter approval. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-4, 13-1-14,
(1966). In Gordon, 51.50 percent of the voters favored the bond issue; 51.51 percent
favored the tax levy. 403 U.S. I(1971).
Washington has a similar constitutional provision which provides that the aggregate
of tax levies upon real property in any taxing district may not exceed forty mills on the
dollar of assessed valuation in any year. WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 2, amendment 17
(1944). The forty mill limit may be exceeded only when three-fifths of the electors voting
authorize an excess levy. The amendment further provides that the election is not valid
unless the number of persons voting constitutes not less than forty percent of the total
number of votes cast in the taxing district in the last general election. The Washington
Supreme Court has held that the sixty percent requirement does not violate equal protection. Thurston v. Greco, 78 Wn.2d 424, 474 P.2d 881 (1970). The Thurston court did
not decide the validity of the forty percent requirement. Id. at 423 n.2, 474 P.2d at 882
n.2.
Other Washington extraordinary provisions include: WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.052
(1961) (authorizing excess levies); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.056 (1961) (excess levies
for capital purposes); WASH. REV. CODE § 39.36.020 (1959) (limiting municipal indebtedness); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.51.020 (1970) (bond elections); WASH. CONST., amend-

ment 27 (1952) (limitation on municipal indebtedness).
For a survey of supermajority schemes in other states see League of Women Voters of
Washington: The 40% -60% Voting Requirement, Pub. No. El-5 (1966). See generally
ADVISORY ('OMMISSION ON IN I ER-GOVERNMENTAI RELATIONS, UNITED STATES CONGRESS.
ADSA I t IOIY RI SI RK I ION' ON Lo( -u TAXING POWER (1962).
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quirements violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. After a dismissal by the
trial court, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
requirements did violate the equal protection guarantee. 2 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed. Held: The West Virginia

provisions do not discriminate against any identifiable class and,
therefore, do not violate the equal protection clause. Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
Since its entry into the "political thicket ' 3 in the early 1960's, the
Supreme Court has sought to ensure equal protection with regard to
voting rights in three different settings: (1) cases in which state laws
excluded groups from voting in some or all elections; 4 (2) cases involving state geographical districting systems or representative allocation systems which diluted the effectiveness or "weight" of votes; 5 and
(3) cases concerning the extent to which a state may utilize the polit2. Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
3. This term was first employed by the Supreme Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
4. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (residency requirements for
servicemen held invalid); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (all residency requirements held unconstitutional); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (qualifying examinations excluding racial minorities held unconstitutional); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1965) (poll taxes excluding the poor held
unconstitutional); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (literacy tests held invalid); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting qualifications
based on property ownership held unconstitutional); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969) (voting qualifications based on property ownership held unconstitutional).
With respect to denial based on race, the fifteenth amendment also applies. Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
5. The Court held that an allegation that legislative apportionment denied equal
protection "present [ed] a justiciable constitutional cause of action" in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). The proper test for equal protection in the election of legislative representatives was decided later, the Court holding that "once the geographic unit
for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1962). Applying
the "one man, one vote" principle in later cases, the Court held that the districting of
federal congressional seats must also be based upon "substantial" population equality
among geographic units. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963). A similar conclusion
was reached with respect to the apportionment of both houses of state legislatures. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Subsequent decisions have insisted upon a rule of
"absolute" equality of population. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v.
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969). However, the Court recently permitted an 11.9 percent deviation among local legislative districts where the cause of the deviation was not
a "built-in" group bias. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). The "one man, one vote"
principle has also been extended to many units of local government. Hadley v. Junior
College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 663 (1968).
But see Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967). Both Hadley and Sailors
involved school board officials. However, Sailors involved appointed officials and the
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ical process to impose greater burdens on one group than it imposes
on other groups. 6 The initial question in each case is whether the
voting scheme employed by the state classifies at all. A conclusion that
the particular scheme does not classify will preclude consideration of
the equal protection question because no classes are created to which
the law might be unequally applied. The Gordon Court did not directly decide the classification issue. However, the Court did reach the
ultimate equal protection question and thus impliedly acknowledged
that supermajority schemes do classify. This conclusion seems correct
because supermajority requirements create two groups of voters with
disparate influence, those voting for the proposal and those voting
7
against it.

Court distinguished Gray and Reynolds on that basis. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 109. The
question of whether "a State may constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process" was not decided. Id. at 109-110. In Hadley the officials were elected.
6. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1969) (holding certain Ohio election
laws, which gave established political parties a decided advantage in obtaining positions
on the ballot, unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause); Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (city charter provision requiring that any fair housing
ordinance passed by the city council which regulates on a racial or ethnic basis be submitted to the voters in a citywide referendum was a violation of the equal protection
clause).
7. The effect ofsupermajority voting requirements has been explained as follows:
Unlike the situation in which a simple majority is required and each vote is given
the same weight, the 60 per cent requirement gives a negative vote a weight one
and one-half times as great as that of a favorable vote. One negative vote is 50 per
cent more effective in defeating a proposed bond issue or excess tax levy than a
favorable vote approving it.
Thurston v. Greco, 78 Wn.2d 424, 437, 474 P.2d 881, 888-89 (1970) (dissenting
opinion). For example, in an election in which 100 votes were cast, it would only take
41 negative votes to defeat the proposal, but it would take 60 affirmative votes to pass
it, thus giving a negative vote potentially one and one-half times the weight of an affirmative vote.
The conclusion that supermajority schemes do classify has some support in the federal
courts. See, e.g., Rimarcik v. Johansen, 310 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn. 1970). But see
Brenner v. School District of Kansas City, 315 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The conclusion that such schemes classify is the majority rule among state courts which have
passed on the validity of supermajority schemes. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal.3d 765.
471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). The Westbrook case, which was remanded in light of Gordon, had held that the two-thirds majority
for municipal bond issues required by the California constitution violated the equal
protection clause. See also Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 465 P.2d 639 (1970). appeal
dismissed, 403 U.S. 914 (1971) (the one man, one vote rule does not invalidate Idaho's
constitutional and statutory requirement that a two-thirds majority approve a local government issuance of general obligation bonds); Alhambra City School District v. Mize,
2 Cal.3d 806, 471 P.2d 515, 87 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1970), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 925
(1971) (California statutory and constitutional provisions requiring a two-thirds affirmative vote to approve the issuance of school district general obligation bonds violated the
equal protection clause, but decision limited to prospective application). These cases are
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In dealing with the three types of voting cases noted above, the
Court has proceeded from the initial finding of a classification to a
second issue: what is the proper equal protection test to apply in
judging the validity of the classification? The choice, as in all equal
protection cases, is between a stringent test and a more flexible rational basis test.8 The two primary limitations on state action under
the rational basis test are, first, that the state cannot create arbitrary
classifications 9 and, second, that any classification created must bear a
reasonable relation to the achievement of some legitimate state end.' 0
Absent a clear showing that the legislation attacked constitutes an ar-

bitrary classification or that it promotes no legitimate governmental
interest, state laws are presumed to be constitutional. 1 ' On the other
hand, where a "fundamental right" or "suspect classification" is involved, the stringent test applies. 12 The burden is then on the state to
overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality.' 3 The state is required

to prove that the classification it has chosen is not only non-arbitrary
discussed in Note, Extraordinary Majority Voting Requirements, 58 GEO. L.J. 411
(1969); Note, The ExtraordinaryMajority Rule in MunicipalBonding, 4 LOYOLA (L.A.)
L. REV. 423 (1970); Comment, Equal ProtectionStandards and State "Extra Majority"
Vote Requirements, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 324 (1970).

The only dissent to the conclusion that supermajority schemes classify, as well as the
only decision to face squarely the particular issue, is Thurston v. Greco, 78 Wn.2d 424,
474 P.2d 881 (1970). The Thurston court concluded that the Washington supermajority
requirements did not classify or, if they did, the classification was due to the choice of
the voter and was, therefore, not prospective, but rather "after the fact." Id. at 427, 474
P.2d at 884. No authority was cited for the proposition that prospective classification
would mean no classification. An examination of the authority in the three classes of
voting cases previously noted reveals that the classifications there did operate prospectively. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text, supra.
8. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 806-09 (1969). See generally
Comment, Equal Protection Standards and State "Extra Majority" Vote Requirements,
3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 324, 326 (1970); Tussman and ten Broeck, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
The rational basis test is justified on the ground that unless a fundamental right is
involved, proper respect for the legislature as a coordinate branch of government, as
well as judicial restraint, require a presumption of constitutionality of legislative activity. Cf. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 420 (1920).
9. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
10. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
11. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969). See also International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
12. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to have offspring
is a fundamental right); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (one "suspect classification" to which equal protection standards are strictly applied is one based
on race); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (nationality is a
"suspect classification"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (nationality).
13. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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but necessary 1 4 and that the interest sought to be furthered is not only
legitimate but compelling. 15
Prior to its decision in Gordon, the United States Supreme Court
had consistently applied the stringent test in judging the constitutionality of statutory schemes which denied the right to vote, which
weighted votes (malapportionment) or which imposed greater burdens
on the interests of one group than on the interests of others.' 6 Such an
application resulted from the conclusion that the right to vote, because
7
of its role in preserving "all other basic rights," is a fundamental right.'
The Gordon Court distinguished the malapportionment and denial
cases, stating that:18
The defect.., in those cases lay in the denial or dilution of voting
power because of group characteristics... that bore no valid relation
to the interest of these groups in the subject matter of the election;

moreover, the dilution or denial was imposed irrespective of how
members of those groups actually voted.
14.
15.
16.
U.S. 23
(1962).

Id. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
(1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
In Gray the Court expressed particular concern with respect to apportionment

schemes which weighted the effectiveness of the right to vote, and held:
The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of
representation such as the allocation of Senators irrespective of population and the

use of the electoral college in the choice of a President ...But once the class of
voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by
which equality of voting may be evaded.
Gray, 372 U.S. at 380-81 (emphasis added). With respect to burdening the interests of
one group through the electoral process, the Court in Hunter stated: "IT] he State may
no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legisla-

tion in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393.
17. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds the Court stated:
[S] ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id. at 562. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), the Court decided that "[n] o
right is more precious in a free country [than the right to vote]. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." Both Reynolds and Wesberry
concerned malapportionment. The Court has also concluded that the right to vote is
fundamental in those cases dealing with the outright denial of the right to vote and in the
burdening cases. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(denial of the right to vote); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (burdening the interests of one group of voters). The conclusion that the right to vote is a fundamental
right has long historical acceptance. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
18. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 4 (emphasis added). The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals had noted the weighting effect of the extraordinary majority requirement to con-
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The West Virginia requirements, the Court reasoned, did not deny the
franchise to any person and, unlike the malapportionment cases, did
not weight the votes of some ascertainable class because of geography,
property, race or other extraneous qualification not related to the subject matter of the election. 19
The distinction from the malapportionment and denial cases was
vital to the Court's decision. Viewing the factual situation in Gordon
as distinguishable from that of the voting cases which apply the strin-

gent equal protection test, with its strong presumption of unconstitutionality, the Court was able to apply the rational basis test with its
converse presumption of validity. The Court then noted "that in voting
to issue bonds voters are committing, in part, the credit of infants and
generations yet unborn ' 2 0 and held that extraordinary majority re-

quirements, by making it more difficult to enact projects imposing
bonded indebtedness, reasonably could achieve the end of protecting
elude that the malapportionment cases were controlling. Lance v. Board of Education,
170 S.E.2d 783, 788-89 (W. Va. 1969). Particular reliance was placed on Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1962). In Gray, the Court applied the stringent equal protection test
and the one man, one vote principle to invalidate Georgia's county unit primary election system. The county unit system was much like the electoral college system used in
electing the President of the United States. The West Virginia court recognized that the
one man, one vote principle applied in the malapportionment cases involved the right to
vote in elections for public officials and the possibility of distinguishing those cases
based on the object of the vote, a municipal bond election in Gordon. However, the
court used Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), to apply the one man, one
vote principle to the West Virginia requirements. In Cipriano, the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection guarantee prohibited a state from limiting
the franchise in a local bond election to property taxpayers. The West Virginia court
reasoned that the Cipriano result demanded a strict application of equal protection
standards, regardless of the object of the vote. Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d
783,789 (W.Va. 1969).
19. Gordon,403 U.S. at 5.
20. Id. at 6-7. The conclusion that the protection of future taxpayers from presently
incurred capital debts is a reasonable state interest is undoubtedly correct. However, the
protective functions of supermajority schemes may illustrate the embracing of a lesser
good to the exclusion of a greater good. Authority exists for the proposition that the salient need in local bond financing is flexibility which provides better organization in the
financing process, better planning and, ultimately, more fiscal responsibility to and protection of the taxpayer. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT (August, 1969).

It can be said that the only reason for supermajority requirements in local bond elections is the protection of property taxpayers from high tax indebtedness placed on them
by non-property owners. The protection of property owners would seem to be unconstitutional under Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), although a distinction
might be made because Cipriano involved the outright denial of the franchise to
non-property owners. The Court's avoidance of attributing an impermissible purpose to
a legislature in order to uphold a statute is in accord with general Court precedent. In
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), for example, the Court was confronted with a
Michigan statute which denied bartender's licenses to all women except the wives or
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the credit of future generations. Consequently, both elements of the
rational basis test were satisfied; there was a legitimate state interest
and non-arbitrary classification reasonably related to that end.
In distinguishing the West Virginia requirements from the cases
involving the denial of the right to vote, the Gordon Court was on
firm ground. Clearly supermajority schemes cannot be equated with
outright denial. 2 1 Distinguishing supermajority requirements from the
malapportionment and burdening cases is more questionable and
raises three significant points for consideration: the Court's present
view of requirements diluting or burdening the vote and the implications of this view; the significance of the subject of the vote; and the
propriety of any distinction resulting in less than stringent protection
of voting equality.
The Gordon Court suggested that some clear, ascertainable characteristic-namely, geography--caused the weighting of the vote in the
malapportionment cases and weighting was imposed on a discrete and
insular minority (a specially affected group) without regard to the way
the group actually voted. Supermajority requirements are not of this
22
character and are clearly distinguishable by this categorization.
However, language in the early malapportionment cases indicates that
the Court has been more concerned with the weighting of votes per se
daughters of male bar owners. One might well have argued that the probable purpose of
the statute was monopolizing jobs for men and that such a purpose was impermissible.
Yet, exercising considerable restraint and according a strong presumption of constitutionality to the action of the legislature, the Court refused to inquire into that discriminatory purpose. Instead, the Court attributed to the legislature the conceivable, though
less probable, purpose of avoiding social and moral problems which might accompany
the employment of women in bars.
21. The West Virginia court equated a debasement of the right to vote with outright
denial. Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783, 789 (W.Va. 1969). This was done
on the basis of the following unexplained dictum in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964): "And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of
the franchise." Even such an equation may not be sufficient to support a conclusion that
supermajority requirements are unconstitutional. In McDonald v. Board of Election,
394 U.S. 802 (1969), the Court held that only total denials of the vote because of impermissible reasons, for example, race or wealth, would clearly call for an application of
the stringent equal protection test. McDonald involved a challenge to an Illinois statute
which did not provide for absentee ballots for persons awaiting trial in county jails. The
Court held the failure to provide absentee ballots was not a denial of equal protection.
22. This is because the classification of voters in local bond elections into groups
having more, or less, influence is accomplished by the voter himself in exercising his
vote. The classification is thus internalized with the act of voting itself, not because of
some external standard imposed before the vote is cast. The factor causing the classification in the bond election is also related to the purpose of that election; the purpose of the
election is to test for greater than majority support for a given proposal and classifying
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than with the question of whether the group affected was necessarily
clearly ascertainable. The Court has stated: "But once the class of
voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. '2 3 Furthermore, the Court was not unanimous in the malapportionment
cases in holding that geography is unrelated to the way votes were
cast,2 4 thus indicating difficulty in using this standard as a basis from
which a distinction can be made. Nevertheless, the Court has followed
the requirement of a specially affected group in judging the validity of
dilution allegations in later cases. In Abate v. Mundt25 the Court upheld a population deviation of 11.9 percent between local voting districts, reasoning that the deviation contained no "built-in bias tending
to favor particular geographic areas or political interests ... or de'26
signed to favor particular groups.

The Court has previously applied the same test in burdening cases.
Hunter v. Erickson,2 7 one of the burdening cases, was distinguished in
Gordon on the grounds that Hunter involved a clear, specially affected group of blacks favoring open-housing legislation and that the
group's ability to pass such legislation was hampered solely because of
race. The built-in group bias reading of Hunter has since been fol28
lowed in James v. Valtierra.
affirmative or negative voters by influence achieves that purpose. Finally, the group singled out for special treatment, those favoring or not favoring the bond issue, are specially treated because of the way they vote and, as noted, this treatment has a rational
relation to the purpose of the election.
23. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565 (1964), where the Court indicated that a dilution of the vote impairs a
republican form of government.
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25. 403 U.S. 182(1971).
26. Id. at 185-86. There is some language indicating a built-in group bias view of
vote dilution in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970). The Hadley
Court spoke of a system evidencing a "built-in bias in favor of small districts." Id. at
57-58.
27. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Hunter established the proposition that laws which make it
more difficult for special groups to enact their views into law violated equal protection.
Hunter involved the enactment of fair housing legislation. Provision for fair housing
had originally been made by city ordinance, but a later amendment to the city charter
prevented the city council from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority of the
voters of the town. The change in law was clearly intended to make minority groups
favoring open housing surmount a larger body of resentment.
The Hunter proposition appears relevant in judging the validity of bond supermajority requirements. Such requirements, by giving voters not favoring the particular levy
a greater influence than that of-the voter favoring the levy, make the enactment of the
levy more difficult for those favoring it.
28. 402 U.S. 137 (197 1). James concerned the validity of a California constitutional
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The implication of the built-in bias test for judging the validity of
future dilutions of the vote is made clear by Abate: the burden is first
on the claimant to show the existence of a built-in bias toward a particular group; if unsuccessful, the state need only show a rational basis
for the voting scheme to have it upheld. The Abate Court found the
existence of a long tradition of overlapping county-city functions and
dual representation to be an adequate state need. 29 No showing that
the overlapping be an essential government need was required, thus
illustrating a break from past reluctance to accept any dilution of the
right to vote without strong justification. 30 In sum, the built-in bias
test employed in Gordon and Abate to distinguish the malapportionment cases appears to be an effective way to restrict the one man,
one vote principle enunciated by the Warren Court. Past precedents
31
would be limited to their facts.

amendment prohibiting the development, construction or acquisition of low-rent
housing without the prior approval of a majority of the voters in the community affected.
The Court upheld the amendment under the equal protection clause, distinguishing
Hunter on the basis that no clear group was singled out for discriminatory treatment by
reason of race. James would seem to indicate that Hunter has been limited solely to its
facts: burdening which is clearly based on reasons of race and which generally affects
only members of a single race.
Not mentioned in Gordon was Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Williams
involved the validity of various Ohio election laws making it more difficult for third
party candidates and parties to be placed on official state ballots. The Court applied the
stringent equal protection test in affirming an allegation that the Ohio law, by making it
more difficult for voters favoring third parties and their platforms to enact their philosophy into law, violated the equal protection clause. The Court noted that the group affected by the Ohio laws would "rarely if ever be a cohesive or identifiable group" until
shortly before the election, but found the Ohio laws to be most egregious because of
their application before the possibly identifiable group was formed. Id. at 33. Although
this reasoning directly conflicts with the built-in group bias standard developed in
Hunter and James, and although supermajority requirements for bond elections, by
creating no clear group except a loose number of persons favoring a levy, would seem
to come within the Williams rationale, the case is easily distinguishable from the bond
supermajority area. First, Williams involved the voting for representatives. Second, the
right protected in Williams was more clearly a right of association than a right to vote.
29. Abate, 403 U.S. 182, 186(1971).
30. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 532-36 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969).
31. The implication is that now there is a possibilty that states will be able to argue
successfully that districting resulting in vote dilution is defensible because of tradition.
or because of the need for flexibility and experimentation in new forms of representation and government. Critics of the majority position in the malapportionment cases
have claimed that these ends have been devalued and made unobtainable by prior decisions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964):
Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1967) (dissenting opinions). The
achievement of these ends, however, may be at the expense of categorizing the vote in a
way that will be undesirable. See text accompanying notes 41. 42, infra.
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Unlike the Gordon Court, other courts have more directly distinguished the malapportionment cases from bond supermajority questions by using a subject matter distinction rather than the built-in
group bias method. 32 These courts have emphasized that the vote in
the malapportionment cases was exercised to choose representatives,
while the vote in the extraordinary majority cases was cast for or
against ballot issues. Two special circumstances in the malapportionment cases suggest that the equal protection safeguards afforded
are directed solely to the evils of legislative malapportionment. First,
the election of representatives is arguably more important than an
election involving capital financing. Second, when a legislature is
malapportioned there is no incentive for those representatives of the
minority of the electorate who have control of the legislature to cure
the imbalance. The situation becomes chronic and only the courts can
cure the defect. This is not the situation in the supermajority cases.
Most probably, legislatures will not be reluctant to change the supermajority requirement if the electors so desire. In addition, if the legislature does not act the electorate can achieve the desired result
through the election of new representatives or by initiative. The latter
reasoning may not be successful, however, since the conclusion that
an unequal vote is proper because it can be cured by casting an equal
vote in an election designed to remedy the inequality was rejected in
33
the malapportionment cases.
It can be argued that the Gordon decision has in fact developed a
subject matter distinction for future application in voting cases, although this distinction may only be a concomitant to the enunciated
group bias standard. Prior to Gordon, every United States Supreme
Court decision involving an allegation of the dilution of the right to
vote concerned the selection of representatives for various "legislative" bodies. All the cases, with the exception of Sailors v. Board of
Education,34 applied stringent standards of equal protection in finding

32.

This distinction was suggested in Thurston v. Greco, 78 Wn.2d 424, 428, 474

P.2d 881, 883-84 (1970). The Thurston court relied on Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515,
523, 465 P.2d 639, 645 (1970).

33. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37
(1964).
34. 387 U.S. 105 (1966). Sailorshas lost part, if not all, of its vitality. See Hadley v.
Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970). See also note 5, supra.
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the dilution unconstitutional. By comparing Gordon with past preced35
ent, a clear subject matter distinction is found.
A subject matter distinction has obvious difficulties. First, it ignores
language in past malapportionment decisions clearly rejecting such a
distinction. In Hadley v. Junior College District3 6 the Court stated:
"When a Court is asked to decide whether a State is required by the
Constitution to give each qualified voter the same power in an election
open to all, there is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional dis37
tinctions should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election."
Second, by encompassing the object of the exercise of the vote, the
distinction indicates a failure to understand that that which was protected in the malapportionment cases was the exercise of the vote, the
object of the exercise being merely incidental.3 8 If a vote is "preservative of other basic civil rights,"3 9 then logically those rights are only
preserved when the vote, in any context, is exercised in a pure, unfettered fashion. The object of the vote did not deter the Court from
applying stringent equal protection standards in another bond election
case, Cipriano v. City of Houma.40 These problems may have influenced the Gordon Court in its avoiding specific reference to a subject
matter distinction and in choosing the group characteristics basis.
A final criticism of the Gordon decision transcends the mechanical
application of precedents and goes to the propriety of making any distinction which, in effect, catagorizes the cases in which the vote will
be given full protection. The Gordon Court has classified the protection in one, or both, of two ways. First, the Court has concluded that
the weight of one's vote will not be given stringent protection unless
there is some extraneous qualification, unrelated to the subject matter
of the election, which dilutes or burdens the vote of an ascertainable
group by reason of a "built-in bias" toward that group. Second, al35. "Nor do we decide whether a State may, consistent with the Constitution. require extraordinary majorities for the election of public officers." Gordon, 403 U.S. at
8 n.6. This suggests the recognition of an implicit subject matter distinction resulting
from Gordon.

36. 397 U.S. 50(1970).
37. Id. at 54.
38. Language in many cases supports an inference that what is protected in the right
to vote is its exercise. For example, in Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.
621, 629 (1969), the Court stated: "Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the
subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are permitted
to participate and some are not."
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 562 (1964).
40. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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though not expressly stated by the Court, Gordon may be precedent
for a future holding that the vote will ortly be strictly protected against
dilution where voting for representatives is involved, as opposed to
voting for ballot issues.
The irony of categorizing the right to vote in this manner becomes
clear upon recognizing, for example, that now a statutory requirement
of supermajority authorization for statewide financing is constitutional, 41 while mere de facto geographical weighting of votes in the
election of local officials is impermissible.4 2 If voting for or against a
proposition does not put one into the proper category for constitutional protection, then there simply is no protection of the right to
vote for important issues until outright denial of the franchise is
43
accomplished.
Gordon v. Lance is disappointing to any theorist viewing the exercise of the vote as a fundamental right, incapable of infringement.
Gordon has clearly classified the constitutional protection of the vote
and this categorization has unsettling implications for protecting that
right in cases involving anything short of actual disenfranchisement.
The case is disappointing, but significant, for its break from the malapportionment cases, and its requirement of a clear built-in bias toward an ascertainable group before stringent equal protection standards will be applied. Gordon appears, then, to have developed a basis
for limiting the Warren Court's protection of the vote to past precedent,
opting to extend only the letter, and not the principle, of past voting
cases to new situations. Independent of any legal considerations, the
Burger Court in Gordon has approved a system of local finance which
ignores the basic contemporary need of municipal government, the
need for flexibility rather than extraordinary reflection.
41.

The question of how small a minority of voters may control the decision on ex-

tremely important issues may still be open. The Gordon Court stated: "We initimate

no view on the constitutionality of a provision requiring unanimity or giving a veto
power to a very small group." Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8 n.6.
42. This conclusion is supported by the Gordon Court's reading of past malapportionment cases and by the decision in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50
(1970).
43. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). See
also note 21, supra.
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